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EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
HANS AUFRiCHT*
International agencies are frequently called upon to decide questions
of evidence. In international as well as in domestic law a distinction
has been made between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" evidence. For in-
stance, international agencies when interpreting international agreements
often resort to "extrinsic" evidence as a means of interpretation, when
the "intrinsic" evidence derived from the text of such agreements is incon-
clusive. But extrinsic evidence may also be of decisive significance out-
side the field of treaty' interpretation.
The purpose of this essay is to indicate some principles and practices
relating to extrinsic evidence in international law. To this end the dis-
cussion will proceed under the following headings: (1) Extraneous
"sources of law" or "bases of decision," (-2) Admission and exclusion of
evidence, (3) Appreciation of evidence, (4) Circumstantial evidence,
(5) "Facts,'-notorious facts, facts that require evidence, (6) Intention
of the parties, (7) Qualification of the maxim, "limitations of sover-
eignty cannot be presumed," (8) Means of evidence.
Extraneous "sources of law" or "bases of decisions"
Among the extraneous "sources of law" or "bases of decisions" the
preparatory work (travaux pr~paratoires) is probably of the greatest
general significance. In addition, presumptions, maxims of interpretation,
and decisions by international and domestic tribunals may be deemed
extraneous material.
The preparatory work is of special significance in the interpretation
of the major multilateral conventions which during the last thirty years
have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations and
of the United Nations, and in all those instances where a multilateral
convention has been the result of a special conference convoked for the
purpose of working out a multilaterally acceptable Draft Convention.
The Proceedings of such Conferences are perhaps the outstanding exam-
ple of travaux priparatoires. With the aid of such Proceedings the legis-
lative history of individual provisions may be traced back by comparing
* Assistant Counsellor, Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund, Wash-
ington, D. C.; Lecturer in International Relations and Organization, Graduate School of
American University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund.
1 For the purposes of this paper no distinction is made between the terms "treaty" and
"tagreement"'.
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the preliminary drafts leading to the formulation of the final text, by
scrutiny of the successive versions of individual provisions, by reference
to Committee Reports, Reports of Rapporteurs, statements in Com-
mittee or Plenary Sessions, by relevant statements of delegates to the
public at large.'
The principle that for purposes of clarification of prima Jacie unclear
provisions of an international agreement travaux priparatoires should
be consulted has been embodied in a Resolution adopted on December
24, 1933 by the Seventh International Conference of American States.
Article 3 of this Resolution reads as follows:
When the meaning of an international agreement is not clear from
the text, the real will or purpose of the parties shall be sought from
the preamble and from the diplomatic documents and protocols
involved in the negotiation of the treaty.'
There are numerous awards by international tribunals which are based
on references to travaux pr~paratoires. The majority of these awards
reaffirms the principle that resort to travaux priparatoires is permissible
only if the text of an agreement is unclear.
The following awards of the Permanent Court of International Justice
confirm this principle:
In the Lotus case the Court held:
The Court must recall in this connection what it has said in some
of its preceding judgments and opinions, namely, that there is no
occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a con-
vention is sufficiently clear in itself.4
Nevertheless, the Court apparently examined the preparatory work.
This may be inferred from the following statement:
Moreover, the records of the preparation of the Convention ...
would not furnish anything calculated to overrule the construction
indicated by the actual terms of Article 15.'
In the treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig case the Court stated:
This text not being absolutely clear, it may be useful, in order
to ascertain its precise meaning, to recall here somewhat in detail
2 For Travaux pr~paratoires see comment on Article 19 of the Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties, prepared by the Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School
(hereafter referred to as Harvard Draft Convention) in 29 Am. J. INT'L LAW (Supp. II
1935) 675-1226, and at 956, where it is stated that travaux Prrparatoires "are to be dis-
tinguished from formal reservations and from interpretations mutually agreed upon and
formally recorded as 'authentic' interpretations."
3 Id. at 1225.
4 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 16.
5 Id. at 17.
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the various drafts which existed prior to the adoption of the text
now in force.'
After reviewing these drafts the Court,' taking into account the conten-
tions of the interested parties, stated that the interpretation of the text
contended for by the Polish Government would, in the opinion of the
Court, be incompatible with the preparatory work and "contrary to the
expressed intentions of the Conference of Ambassadors".8
In its Advisory Opinion on the 1919 Convention on Employment oJ
Women during the Night the Court said:
The Court has been so struck with the confident opinions expressed
by several delegates with expert knowledge of the subject at Geneva
during the discussions in 1930 and 1931 on the proposal to revise
the Washington Convention on Night Work of Women to the affect
that the Convention applied only to working women-ouvri res-
that the Court has been led to examine the preparatory work of the
Convention in order to see whether or not it confirmed the opinions
expressed at Geneva.9
In doing so, the Court does not intend to derogate in any way from
the rule which it has laid down on previous occasions that there is
no occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a
convention is sufficiently clear in itself.
In the Lighthouse cases the Court held:
The Court cannot regard the expression "duly entered into" as
a technical term, invariably possessing the same signification. Where
the context does not suffice to show the precise sense in which the
Parties to the dispute have employed these words in their. Special
Agreement, the Court, in accordance with its practice, has to consult
the documents preparatory to the Special Agreement, in order to
satisfy itself as to the true intention of the Parties'
Among the decisions rendered by Arbitral Tribunals the Salem claim
and the Soci~t6 Vinicole de Champagne v. W. de Mumm, case are of
special interest.
In the Salem claim (1932) the majority (2 to 1) held:
That an arbitral tribunal is authorized to interpret the arbitration
agreement (compromise) whereunder it is constituted has been con-
tested in certain cases, but the prevailing opinion in international
practice acknowledges their right to do so. Such interpretation is
however only admissible if the wording of the compromise allows
6 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 44, p. 33.
7 Id. at 33-36.
8 Id. at 36-37.
9 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 50, p. 378.
10 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 62, p. 13.
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of several meanings of which none can be recognized as the clear
will and purpose of the parties. In this case the Arbitral Tribunal
has to investigate which meaning agrees with what has been the joint
will of the parties when they concluded the compromise. Now, in
order to ascertain in the joint will of the parties, an arbitral tribunal
is likewise entitled, according to the predominating international
practice, to refer to the discussions and negotiations which led to the
compromise.'
In Socijtj Vinicole de Champagne v. W. de Mumm, the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal interpreted certain sections of Part X of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles in the light of the exchange of notes between the German dele-
gation and the Allied and Associated Powers. 2
The question of the value of travaux priparatoires in interpreting
treaty provisions was extensively discussed by the International Court
of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948 on Conditions of
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4
of the Charter). The Minority Opinions ascribed decisive significance
to the preparatory work. The Dissenting Judges Basdevant, Winiarsk6,
Sir Arnold McNair and Read said:
Without wishing to embark upon a general examination and
assessment of the value of resorting to travaux priparatoires in the
interpretation of treaties, it must be admitted that if ever there is a
case in which this practice is justified it is when those who negotiated
the treaty have embodied in an interpretative resolution or some
similar provision their precise intentions regarding the meaning
attached by them to a particular article of the treaty. This is exactly
what was done with respect to paragraph 2 of Article 4.1"
And Mr. Zoricic, in his Dissenting Opinion, refers to the preparatory
work as follows:
11 Salem Claim, Award, ARBITRATION SERIES No. 4, Pt. (6) (Dep't State 1933) 29.
12 1 RECUEIL DES DCISIONS DES TRISUNAUX ARBITRAUX MLXTES INSTITUgS PAR LES
TRAIT9S DE PAIX (1922) at 22, 25, 26. Additional references to travaux priparatoires in
cases decided by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals are to be found in the comments to the
Harvard Draft Convention, op. cit. at 959. For additional arbitral decisions which con-
tain references to the significance of preparatory work see Cma.RLES RoussEAu, PRINcIPs
GfNxRAUx DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944) at 736-739. On preparatory work see.
also Harvard Draft Convention, op. cit. at 956-966; McNAiR, THE LAW oF TREATIES
(1938), especially at 262-270; HACKWORTH, 5 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 259-263 (1943);
HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 652-655 (1943);
HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 1482-1483 (2nd ed. 1945); Lauterpacht, Some Observa-
tions on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REV. 549-
591 (1935); ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES GNiRAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944),
especially at 748-762 (containing numerous quotations from and references to cases);
SPENCER, L'INTERPRETATION DES TRAITgS PAR LES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES (1935).
13 I.C.J. Reports 1948, p. 87.
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The two reports of the Committees were approved by the respec-
tive Commissions, and it is difficult to suppose that the carefully
chosen wording of these reports, considered first in the Committees,
and then by the Commissions, does not express their thoughts and
true intentions. On the contrary, I believe that these reports are
to be taken as agreements on the interpretation of the provisions
in question, and that consequently their terms must be understood
and applied in their normal meaning as forming the surest means of
interpreting Article 4 of the Charter.14
Mr. Krylov, in his Dissenting Opinion, also relied on the preparatory
work.' 5
The following general principles may be derived from the opinion of
writers,16 general principles of interpretation and numerous decisions
by international tribunals:
An international tribunal is in principle authorized to take travaux
pr~paratoires into consideration, provided a specific provision of a docu-
ment or a rule established by oral agreement is unclear and its meaning
open to doubt. This authority includes the competence of the Court to
determine as to whether or not a specific rule is unclear. Parties to a
dispute may, however, in a compromis ad hoc exclude expressly the
Court's authority to resort to preparatory material.
Wherever dissenting or individual opinions of judges, arbiters, com-
missioners, are permissible 7 it is conceivable that the tribunal is divided
on the question as to whether a certain provision is clear.
The International Court of Justice for example, in its Advisory Opinion
of May 28, 1948 was so divided. Only the majority opinion held that
there was no need to resort to preparatory work.'8
In addition to a situation where members of a Court differ as to
whether a specific rule is "clear", a situation is conceivable where a dif-
ferent interpretation of the rule is based on a different interpretation of
the travaux prnparatoires. The dissent of Judge Anzilotti to the Advisory
Opinion on the 1919 law on Employment of Women during the Night
may serve to illustrate the latter situation. It reads in part as follows:
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that a correct interpretation
14 Id. at 100.
15 Id., especially p. 110.
16 See note 12, supra.
17 See, for instance, Article 74, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court of the International
Court of Justice which provides: "Any judge may, if he so desires, attach his individual
opinion to the judgment, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a bare state-
ment of his dissent. See also Article 84, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court relating to Ad-
visory Opinions which is in substance identical with Article 74, paragraph 2.
18 I.CJ. Reports 1948, p. 63.
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of Article 3 of the Convention of Washington leads to the conclusion
that that Convention applies exclusively to woman manual workers.
If however any doubt were possible, it would be necessary to refer
to the preparatory work, which, in such case, would be adduced not
to extend or limit the scope of a text clear in itself, but to verify the
existence of an intention not necessarily emerging from the text but
likewise not necessarily excluded by that text.
Now the preparatory work shows most convincingly that the in-
tention of the Washington Conference was to maintain-whilst for
technical reasons adopting a new convention-the main lines of the
Berne Convention, save for a certain number of clearly indicated
modifications none of which relate to the question before us. And
since the Berne Convention, according both to its actual terms and
to the universally adopted interpretation thereof, refers only to
women manual workers, it follows that the intention of the Con-
ference was to regulate the night employment of women manual
workers. Thus the preparatory work would, if need be, confirm the
interpretation which, in my view, naturally flows from the text of
the Convention. 8
Rules on Admission and Exclusion of Evidence
As to the admissibility of evidence, i.e., evidence proper as well as
extrinsic evidence, many writers and international awards recognize the
principle that "the greatest liberality will obtain in the admission of evi-
dence" before international tribunals.
This principle has been clearly formulated and repeatedly reaffirmed
in the awards of the Mexican Claims Commissions. In the case of Lillie
S. Kling (United States v. Mexico) the General Claims Commission,
established under the Claims Convention signed September 8, 1923, said:
Little adjective law has been developed in international practice.
International tribunals are guided to some extent by rules formu-
lated in connection with each arbitration. With respect to matters
of evidence they must give effect to common sense principles under-
lying rules of evidence in domestic law.20
In the U.S.A. (William A. Parker) v. United Mexican States the same
Commission rules:
For the future guidance of the respective agents, the Commission
announces that, however appropriate may be the technical rules of
evidence obtaining in the jurisdiction of the United States or Mexico
as applied to the conduct of trials in their municipal courts, they
19 P.C.I.j., Series A/B, No. 50, pp. 388-389.
20 OPINONS or CoamMssioNmRs, Docket 3114 (1931) 36, 45. On the Mexican Claims
Commission see FELLER, TaR MAx CLAims COMMISSIONS (1935); on evidence, see
especially at 250-283.
[Vol. 35
EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
have no place in regulating the admissibility of and in the weighing
of evidence before this international tribunal. There are many rea-
sons why such technical rules have no application here, among them
being that this Commission is without power to summon witnesses
or issue processes for the taking of depositions with which municipal
tribunals are usually clothed. The Commission expressly decides
that municipal restrictive rules of adjective law or of evidence cannot
be here introduced and given effect by clothing them in such phrases
as 'universal principles of law' or 'the general theory of law', and
the like. On the contrary, the greatest liberality will obtain in the
admission of evidence before this Commission with a view of dis-
covering the whole truth with respect to each claim submitted.2'
In the Shufeldt Claim (United States v. Guatemala) the arbitrator
declared: ; :1
On the question of evidence over which there was some argument, I
may point out that in considering the cases quoted on both sides it
is clear that international courts are by no means as strict as munici-
pal courts and cannot be bound by municipal rules in the receipt and
admission of evidence. The evidential value of any evidence pro-
duced is for the international tribunal to decide under all the cir-
cumstances of the case.2 2
In the same vein is the frequently quoted separate opinion of Judge
van Eysinga in the Oscar Chinn case. Judge Eysinga stated there that
the Permanent Court of International Justice is "not tied to any system
of taking evidence .. its task is to cooperate in the objective ascertain-
ment of the truth".23
The principle that "the greatest liberality in the admission of evidence
obtains in international law" has been justified on various grounds. Sev-
eral writers, comparing the strict common law rules on evidence with the
more liberal principles which govern the international law of evidence,
explain the difference between the common law and the international law
of evidence primarily by reference to the common law jury system which
has no counterpart in international law.'
21 OPINIONS OF THE ColonssIONERS 35, 38, 39 (1927).
22 ARBITRATION SERIES, No. 3 (Dep't State 1932) 852.
P.C.IJ., Series A/B, No. 63, p. 146.
24 SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TaIBuNALs 119 (1939). Sandifer says:
"It is significant that the term admissibility finds but very little use in describing the
reception of evidence in civil law. It has seemed more appropriate, therefore, to use the
term admission as descriptive of the procedure or of the reception of evidence by inter-
national tribunals. What is examined under this heading, and in other parts of this study
where questions of the acceptance and exclusion of evidence are considered, is primarily




It is controversial whether the rules governing admission of evidence
are "genuine" rules of customary international law, or whether they are
in the last analysis derived from general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations in the sense of Article 38, paragraph 3 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. Lauterpacht states on this point:
"It is in their capacity as courts of justice that international tribunals
have taken over and adopted for their purposes private law rules of evi-
dence and procedure. Intervention, exceptions (demurrers), the rules
of evidence, the burden of proof-all these questions touch upon the
subject under discussion."' In apparent conflict with this statement is
the ruling of the United States-Mexican General Claims Commission in
the William A. Parker case:
The Commission expressly decides that municipal restrictive rules
of adjective law or of evidence cannot be here introduced and given
effect by clothing them in such phrases as "universal principles of
law" or "the general theory of law", and the like.26
It may be argued, however, that this ruling is directed only against a
tendency to consider municipal restrictive rules of evidence as "general
principles of law," but not against rules of evidence as such.
A corollary to the broad discretionary powers of international tribu-
nals to admit evidence is their discretionary right to exclude evidence.
The Permanent Court of International Justice has at various occa-
sions excluded certain types of evidence. In the Chorzow case the Court
declined to consider the reference to the German-Polish Arbitration Treaty
initialled at Locarno on October 16, 1925. It declared: "This reference
• ..cannot serve to modify the source from which, according to the
Application, the Court derives jurisdiction"."
The Danube Commission case furnishes a noteworthy example of ex-
clusion of travaux priparatoires on another ground than that the text
in itself is sufficiently clear. The Court refused to consider the legis-
lative history of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Versailles on the
grounds that the work preparatory to the adoption of these Articles is
classified as "confidential" and that it has not "been placed before the
Court by, or with the consent of, the competent authority". s The Court
did not consider as relevant the Protocole interpritatij to Article 6 of the
Statute of the Danube which Romania also invoked on the ground that
25 LAUTERPAcHT, PRivATE LAW SOURCES AND ANAIOGIS or INTERNATIONAL LAW 210-211
(1927).
26 See note 21, supra.
27 P.C.I.1., Series A/B, No. 9, p. 19.
28Id. at 32.
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"the States interested in the present dispute do not agree as to the true
meaning and the value of the Protocol, and it appears from the record
before the Court that the members of the [European Danube] Commis-
sion who had signed the Protocol also disagreed as to its proper mean-
ing'. 29
As previously indicated an international tribunal usually enjoys broad
discretionary powers as to the admission or exclusion of evidence. How-
ever, if the Rules of Procedure of the tribunal provide for certain time
limits within which evidence has to be submitted, any evidence furnished
by either party after the expiration of such time limits may validly be
excluded. A Rule to this effect is contained, for instance, in Article 48
of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice. °
In short, there is probably no general rule of international law requiring
a court to exclude evidence as such.31 As concerns extrinsic evidence,
however, the general principle is recognized that extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible only if the intrinsic evidence is inconclusive.
Appreciation of evidence
A distinction has frequently been made between the admission and the
appreciation of evidence. There is considerable agreement that freedom
in the admission of evidence means that any evidence at all will be
admitted, i.e., it will go into the record and be considered by the tribu-
nal; freedom in evaluation of evidence means that the tribunal will be
enabled to give to the evidence admitted such weight as it desires.32
In practice international tribunals have frequently in the same ruling
asserted both freedoms. In this section supporting statements are quoted
primarily with a view to proving that the principle of freedom in the
evaluation of evidence has been widely accepted.
This freedom of evaluation has been clearly formulated in two cases
decided by the Mexican Claims Commission:
As far as the kind of evidence is concerned, our Commission is not
bound by any rule of the Convention ...and it has the greatest
freedom of appreciation in this regard; ...it considers the testi-
mony, declarations and expert opinions in the record as amply suf-
ficient to establish the nature and the importance of the losses of
which claimants complain.33
29 Id. at 33.
•30 On Time of Submission of Evidence, see, SADI ER, op. cit., Ch. IT, especially at 68-69.
31 Id. at 129.
32 FELLER, op. cit., p. 259. On "freedom of appreciation", see also SANDIFER, op. cit., p. 12.
"The general principle that the probative force of the evidence presented is for the tribu-
nal to determine has received frequent statement."
33 Case of the Compania Azucarera del Paraiso Novello (reorganized French-Mexican
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In accordance with the provisions of Art. 25 of the Rules, the Com-
mission will receive and consider all declarations, documents and
other written evidence presented by the agents; consequently, the
evaluation of these documents, declarations and other evidence is
subject to the judgment of the Commission in every case, without
subjection to special rules of procedure.'
In the Arbitral Award in the Island of Palmas case Max Huber, the
sole arbitrator, held:
It is for the Arbitrator to decide both whether allegations do or
-as being within the knowledge of the tribunal-do not need evi-
dence in support and whether the evidence produced is sufficient
or not; and finally whether points left aside by the parties ought
to be elucidated. This liberty is essential to him, for he must be
able to satisfy himself on those points which are necessary to the
legal construction upon which he feels bound to base his judgment.
He must consider the totality of the allegations and evidence laid
before him by the Parties, either motu proprio or at his request and
decide what allegations are to be considered as sufficiently sub-
stantiated.3 5
The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in the case con-
cerning German Interests in Upper Silesia that "the Court is entirely free
to estimate the value of statements made-by the parties." 6
Although there can be no doubt that the principle of the freedom in
the appreciation of evidence is generally recognized in international law,
it would be erroneous to assume that this principle is only recognized
in international law. Actually many modern codes of civil procedure
have embodied it as basic. The Austrian and German Codes of Civil
Procedure, for instance, have incorporated the principle of the freie
Beweiswiirdigung and in the practice of French Courts the principle of
libre conviction is recognized. 7
Commission, Decision No. 70 (unpublished)), quoted in F=ILFR, op, cit, pp. 258-259
(note 19).
34 Rep. Alemana (Jwan Andresen) v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (German-Mexican Com-
mission, Decision No. 17 (unpublished)), quoted ibid.
35 2 REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBiTALa AwARDs (U.N) 841.
36 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 73.
37 For the principle of the freedom of appreciation of evidence see Section 272 of the
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure in Die Jurisdiktionsnorm und die Zivilprozessordnung 261
(4th ed., Vienna 1948), by Franz Fetter; see also Section 267 of the same Code and the
cross references to related provisions cited there. Karl Wolff, Grundriss des isterreichischen
Zivilprozessrechts 282 (Vienna 1936) defines Beweiswfirdigung as follows: "Appreciation
of evidence is the finding as to whether or not proof has been furnished." [English trans-
lation supplied]. The original German version of this definition reads: "Die Beurteilung,
ob der Beweis erbracht ist oder nicht, heisst Beweiswiirdgung." See also Section 286 of
the German Civil Code in Zivilprozessordnung 520f. (18th Adolf Baumbach ed., Munich
and Berlin, 1947).
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Circumstantial Evidence
"Circumstantial evidence" is not synonymous or coextensive with
extrinsic evidence; it constitutes rather a special aspect of extrinsic
evidence. It includes, thus, the general "historical situation" at the time
of the conclusion of an international convention, the circumstances of
the parties at the time the convention was entered into, and subsequent
conduct of the parties. By contrast, the so-called legislative history of
an individual provision of an international convention is usually confined
to the various drafting stages of a particular provision,. rather than to the
circumstances surrounding the conclusion, execution, and termination of
a treaty. Accordingly, the legislative history of one, or several pro-
visions of an international convention is to be considered a special case
of the significance of travaux priparatoires. However, at times no clear-
cut distinction is made between these two types of extrinsic evidence.,
International courts, in exploring all circumstances that may contribute
to the sound interpretation of a disputed rule, may consider and actually
have considered "historic facts." It is noteworthy that even legal prin-
ciples prevailing at the time of the conclusion of an international con-
vention may be considered as circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the
Permanent Court of International Justice in considering the territorial
jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder declared
that, in case the purely grammatical analysis of a text should not lead
to definite results, "there are many other methods of interpretation, in
particular, reference is properly had to the principles underlying the
matter to which the text refers." 9 An international tribunal may, in
addition to the implications of a legal principle at a given time, take
into account subsequent modifications of that principle. In the Oder
Commission case, for instance, the Permanent Court of International
Justice deemed it necessary to "go back to the principles governing
international fluvial law in general," to consider the conception of inter-
national river law as laid down by the Act of Congress of Vienna of
38 JOKY, DE L'INTERPRETATION DES TRAITES NoRmAriA S 146 (1936), who rightly emphasizes
the need for a distinction between "history of the text" and other historic circumstances,
quotes the Memel case (Series A/B, No. 47) as an illustration of a confusion on the part
of the Permanent Court of International Justice of "les faits historiques, avec les travaux
priparatoires." Actually, such a confusion can only be read into the French version of
the Court's decision. While the French text reads: "Quant aux considerations d'ordre his-
torique . . . " the English version reads: "As regards the arguments based on the history of
the text ... ." Hence, the English text leaves no doubt that the Court referred to the pre-
paratory work rather than to historical facts. (Series A/B, No. 47, p. 249).
39 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, p. 26.
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June 9, 1815, and to consider what position was adopted by the Treaty
of Versailles in regard to these principles.40
In the Eastern Greenland case the Permanent Court of International
Justice surveyed briefly the history of Greenland from 900 A.D. to the
Peace Treaty of Kiel, dated January 14th, 1814. The Court considered
as evidence of the legal status of Greenland prior to 1380, the year when
the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark were united, reports by a saga
writer. It stated: "The historian, or saga writer, Sturda Thordarson
tells (about 1261) how the men of Greenland undertook to pay tribute,
and how for every man murdered, a fine should be payable to the King
[of Norway] . 4.... 1
The circumstances prevailing at the time of the conclusion of a con-
vention may be the result of events that have occurred decades or even
centuries ago. It should be noted that the circumstances prevailing at
the time of the conclusion of a convention take on a particular signifi-
cance, if the maintenance of the status quo ante, i.e., the circumstances
prior to the conclusion of the convention constitute an integral considera-
tion. In its Advisory Opinion concerning the European Danube Commis-
sion the Court held:
... it is quite reasonable to suppose that the controversy was settled
on the basis of the status quo ante bellum .... the restoration of
the status quo ante bellum was one of the leading principles of the
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the Danube as well
as of those of the Definitive Statute.
The Court therefore has arrived at the conclusion that the words
"under the same conditions as before and without any modification
of its existing limits" in Article 6 of the Definitive Statute, refer
to the conditions which existed in fact before the war in the con-
tested sector, and that their effect is to maintain and confirm these
conditions ..... 42
In its Advisory Opinion concerning Polish War Vessels in the Port of
Danzig the Permanent Court of International Justice declared that it
was, in principle, willing to take notice, as "a matter of history," of the
promise to Poland by the Allied and Associated Powers of a "free and
secure access to the sea," advanced in connection with the Peace Settle-
ment after World War I. However, since the Court considered the con-
tents of Section XI of Part III of the Treaty of Versailles "a complete
40 Id. at 27. See on this case also Hyde, The Interpretation of Treaties by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, 24 Am. J. INT'L LAW at 8-10 (1930).
41 p.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 27.
42 P.C.IJ., Series B, No. 14, pp. 27-28.
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fulfillment of the promise,"" the Court did not see any reason for giving
special weight to the reference to this "matter of history."
Express reference to the circumstances leading to a certain legal situa-
tion is to be found in the Advisory Opinion concerning the Treatment of
Polish Nationals. Here the Court declared:
The prohibition against discrimination can best be understood in the
light of the circumstances which led to the creation of Danzing as a
Free City4
Similarly, the judgment on the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the
District of Gex reads in part as follows:
All the instruments above mentioned and the circumstances in which
they were drawn up establish, in the Court's opinion, that the inten-
tion of the Powers was, . . . to create in favour of Switzerland a right
on which that country could rely to the withdrawal of the French
Customs barrier behind the political frontier of the District of Gex,
that is to say, of the Gex Free zone 45
The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (1910) furnishes an-
other example for the consideration of historical circumstances by an
international tribunal. The tribunal refuted the contention of the United
States that the term "in common with British subjects" should be in-
terpreted not as implying a common subjection to regulation, but as "in-
tending to negative a possible pretension on the part of the inhabitants
of the United States to liberties of fisheries exclusive of the rights of
British subjects to fish." 46 The Tribunal was unable to agree with this
contention on the ground that "such an interpretation is inconsistent with
the historical basis of the American fishing liberty.""
The foregoing references to and quotations from opinions of inter-
national tribunals are designed to show that international tribunals have
repeatedly given special weight to historical facts and circumstances
when they interpreted the documentary material in the light of historical
facts and circumstances.
The cases referred to heretofore take into account: (1) circumstances
preceding the conclusion of an international convention, (2) circum-
stances leading to the conclusion of a convention, (3) circumstances pre-
vailing at the time of the conclusion of a convention, (4) legal principles
43 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 43, p. 144.
44 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 24, p. 27. Italics added.
45 P.C.I.3., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 144. Italics added.
46 1 PROCEEDINGS 3N THE NORTH ATLAwic COAST FIsmm:as ARBiTRATIoN, Sen. Doc. No.




recognized at the time of the conclusion of a convention and subse-
quent modifications of these principles, (5) a combination of two or all
of the foregoing factors. In addition, circumstances subsequent to the
conclusion of such a convention may be taken into account. In particu-
lar the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty may
be an extremely significant element4 8 Since a treaty or convention may be
abrogated through conclusive acts of one of the parties thereto, it follows
a fortiori that the conduct of the parties to a validly concluded treaty
may not only affect the treaty in its entirety, but also the meaning of
individual provisions.
However that may be, the problems that axe traditionally discussed in
connection with the clausula rebus sic stantibus are outside the scope of
this paper.
"Facts"--Notorious Facts, Facts That Require Evidence
There is ample evidence that legally relevant "facts" are matters of
concern to international tribunals. Special procedures, designed to as-
certain such facts and to ensure proper evaluation of such facts, have
been developed under international law and recognized by international
tribunals.
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, for instance, provided expressly for International
Commissions of Inquiry to facilitate the settlement of disputes "arising
from a difference of opinion on points of fact." (See Article 9 of the
1907 Convention.) Under Article 10 of the 1907 Convention the In-
quiry Commission "defines the facts to be examined. . . ." By virtue of
Article 22 of the same Convention the Commission is entitled to ask
from either party for such explanations and information as it considers
necessary 49
These International Commissions on Inquiry are the prototype of
several fact-finding organs established subsequently by the League of
Nations and the United Nations. In general, such Commissions enjoy a
high degree of discretion in the collection and evaluation of evidence as
to "facts."
The Statute and the Rules of the International Court of Justice also
48 For cases and discussion relating to subsequent conduct of parties see Harvard Draft
Convention, op. cit., at 966-970.
49 The following cases relate to an International Commission of Inquiry instituted in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions. The Dogger
Bank Case, see SCOTT, HAGUE COURT REPORTS 403 (1916); Tavignano case, ibid., p. 413,
616; and the Tiubantia case, ibid. (2d ser. 1932) 133.
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contain several references to "facts." Article 42(1) of the Rules, pro-
vides that "A Memorial shall contain a statement of the relevant facts,
a statement of law, and the submissions." The so-called optional clause
(Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute) recognizes in subparagraph (c)
"the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning . . . the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation." Moreover, Article 61, paragraph 1 of the
Statute provides that an application for revision of judgment may be
made if "it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as
to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given,
unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always
provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence."
It follows from the principle of the freedom in appreciation of evi-
dence"0 that the International Court of Justice has complete freedom to
decide whether certain facts are relevant and whether the evidence at.
the disposal of the Court concerning such facts is satisfactory. In this
connection it sbould be noted that Articles 53 to 55 of the Rules of Court
contain special provisions as to witnesses and experts.
As to "notorious facts" it seems to be a general principle of law, in-
herent in the meaning of the term "notorious facts," that no evidence
is required to prove a notorious fact."
Thus in the case Fabiani v. Venezuela the arbitrator, the President of
the Swiss Confederation, held that even in ordinary tribunals's2 notice
could be taken of facts so notorious that proof would be unnecessary and
that there are even stronger reasons to apply this principle in matters of
international arbitration provided the application of the principle has
not been excluded by the parties. 3
Certain "historical facts" may be considered notorious, but not all
"historical facts" are necessarily of this sort. On the contrary, extensive
research may be required to ascertain a "historical fact." Conversely,
a fact may be notorious, but not of a general significance and therefore
not historical. In short, if a "historical fact" is a "notorious fact" no
evidence is required, but if a "historical fact" is not a "notorious fact"
50 See, discussion on "Appreciation of Evidence," supra.
51 SA D ER states, op. cit., that this principle is to be found only in Anglo-American and
German procedural law (269).
52 See in this context the Anglo-American principle of "Judicial Notice" which "means
that Courts consider, without evidence, those matters of public concern which are known to
all well-informed persons." State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 Pac. 910, 66 A. L. R. 1369
(1929).
53 For the text of the award see MooRE, 5 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBiTAIoNs (1898) to which the United States has been a Party, at page 4905.
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it should, as previously indicated, be considered a special case of cir-
cumstantial evidence.'
It may be controversial whether certain legal measures are "facts" and
which legal measures may be considered "notorious facts." In the case
concerning German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia the Permanent
Court of International Justice declared that from the viewpoint of the
Court "municipal laws are merely facts" when it said:
From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is
its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will
and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal
decisions or administrative measures. 5
This is in line with the principle of Anglo-American procedural law
that foreign law is a fact to be proved.56
In connection with the Advisory Opinion relating to certain Danzig
Legislative Decrees Judge Anzilotti rendered an individual opinion which
is designed to justify and to explain the authority of the Permanent
Court of International Justice to accord different treatment to domestic
as compared with international law rules, when he held:
Article 38 of the Statute, which states the sources of law to be ap-
plied by the Court, only mentions international treaties or custom
and the elements subsidiary to these two sources, to be applied if
both of them are lacking. It follows that the Court is reputed to
know international law; but it is not reputed to know the domestic
law of the different countries.5 7
In other words, municipal law cannot be considered a "notorious fact,"
but has to be proved before the Court. On the other hand, the Court
"is reputed to know international law." Similarly, in the Las Palmas
Island arbitration, the arbitrator, Huber, considered the Treaty of
Utrecht as "of public notoriety and accessible to the Parties." 58
Intention of the Parties
The "intention of the parties" may be considered extraneous evi-
dence, whenever such evidence is secured outside the text of a con-
54 RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIMuNALs 105, note 66 (Supp. to
Rev. ed. 1936) and THE LAw AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TuNAA s 219 (Rev. ed.
1926) refers to the De Lamos case (reported in VENxzuErAN ARBIrRATIoNS OF 1903, p. 310,
321) as an example, for "historical facts" which at the same time are considered by an
international tribunal at "notorious facts."
55 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 19.
56 See SANDIFER, op. cit., p. 274, note 18.
57 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 65, p. 61.
58 See note 35, supra, Huber's opinion at p. 842.
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vention. On the other hand, to the extent that it has expressly been
stated in the text of the convention at issue, it cannot be deemed extrane-
ous evidence.
The intention of the parties insofar as it can be inferred from the
travaux pr~paratoires and surrounding circumstances has been discussed
in the first and fourth parts of this paper. Intention may, however, be
proved by other means such as conclusive acts, or the objects of the con-
vention. It may be added that consideration of the intention of the parties
is a basic principle underlying the domestic law on the interpretation of
contracts in many countries. This principle has been embodied, for in-
stance, in Article 1156 of the French Civil Code, Paragraph 914 of the
Austrian Civil Code, Sections 133 and 157 of the German Civil Code,
and Section 18 of the Swiss Code on Obligations (Schweizerisckes Obli-
gationenrecht).
It is a widely recognized principle that an international tribunal
should seek to ascertain from all the available evidence the intention of
the parties to a convention. 9
Of the numerous decisions on this question by international tribunals
the following cases seem to be of special interest:
In the van Bokkelen case the arbitrator held:
.. the judicial tribunals of a country, when called upon to decide
controversies between individuals which grow out of or are depen-
dent upon treaty stipulations, will not hesitate to construe the lan-
guage of those treaties according to the rules of law which apply
to all instruments. They will construe the provisions so as to give
effect to rather than to defeat the intention of the contracting parties;
and they will reconcile apparent conflicts of particular parts by refer-
ence to the context in which they occur and to the whole instru-
ment.6 0
The arbitrator in the Manica case referred to "the rule of legal inter-
pretation, according to which the expressions made use of in a contract
must be taken in the sense most in accordance with the intentions of the
parties who have arranged it and the most favorable to the aim of the
contract. . .. ",
59 See for instance, McNAiR, TnE LAW OF TREATIES 185 (1938). "The primary rule is
that the tribunal should seek to ascertain from all the available evidence the intention of
the parties in using the word or phrase being interpreted." It should be noted that McNair
does not make any distinction as to whether such evidence is extrinsic or intrinsic evidence.
By contrast, Ehrlich, L'Interpritation des Trait~s, 24 REcuEm DES CouRs 117-139, con-
siders the "intention of the parties" exclusively as a matter of extrinsic evidence by dis-
cussing it under the heading "Recherche de la Volont6 en Dehors du texte."
60 For full report, see, MooRE, 2 HISTORY AxD DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBiTRA-
TION 1837 f. (especially at 1852).
61 Id. (vol. 5) at 5011.
1950]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
In the case of the Ottomon Public Debt the arbitrator stated in refer-
ence to a question at issue:
De l'avis de l'Arbitre, la question doit 6tre r~solue, non d'apr~s une
r6gle de droit pur, mais bien plut6t en conformit6 de l'intention com-
mune des Hautes Parties contractantes, telle que l'Arbitre est appel6
A. l'interpreter.62
Similarly, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in the
Ckorzow case as follows:
For the interpretation of Article 23 [of the Geneva Convention be-
tween Germany and Poland signed at Geneva May 15, 192-2] ac-
count must be taken not only of the historical development of arbi-
tration treaties, as well as of the terminology of such treaties, and
of the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used, but also
and more especially of the function which, in the intention of the
contracting parties is to be attributed to this provision."3
To be sure, the principle that extraneous evidence may be sought by
an international tribunal to ascertain the intention of the parties may
be subject to the following qualifications: (1) an international tribunal
is authorized to resort to extraneous evidence as to the intention of the
parties only if the meaning of the text does not closely reveal the
intention of the parties;64 (2) several writers on international law
contend that the interpretation of a treaty by reference to the ex-
press or implied intention of the parties is hardly applicable to treaties
in which the intention of one of the contracting parties was of little
consequence, i.e., to treaties imposed by force;65 (3) other writers con-
tend that in case of certain multilateral treaties, especially those that
62 Affaire de la Dette Publique Ottomane (1925) in 2 REPORTS o ITERATiONAL ARBI-
TRAL AwARDs (U.N.) 556.
63 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 24. For a discussion of the rulings of the Permanent Court
of International Justice on "intention of the parties," see, HuDsoN, T3E PER = ~rE CourT
or NITERNATIONAL JUsTICE, 1920-1942 at 643-645 (1943).
64 See on this point Yi-TNO CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION oF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL
TRBUNALS 61, 183 (1933).
65 See LAUTERPAcHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW N T INTERNATIONAL CoamnuITY 272
(1933). In this connection see also the Treaty of St.-Gerinain (Yugoslav Liquidations) case
decided by the Austrian Supreme Court, April 11, 1934. On the question whether the
treaty of St.-Germain had been interpreted in accordance with the intention of the Parties
the Court ruled: "It cannot be said that there has been a departure from the 'avowed
intention' of the Treaty. Since that document, although for the most part representing the
dictates of the Allied and Associated Powers, is nevertheless to be regarded as being in
essence an agreement, we must look not only to the will of the victor States but also to
the discoverable intention of Austria . . ." (Translation in A.ruAL DIGEST AND REPORTS
of PUBIc INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES (1933-1934)) (Lauterpacht ed.) Case No. 118, p.
297-298.
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are open to accession, there may be different "intentions" on the part of
those parties that have been primarily responsible for the drafting of
the treaties and other parties; 66 (4) the "intention" of the original parties
to multilateral treaties may be different from the intention of those parties
that subsequently adhered to such a treaty.
Qualification of the Maxim That "Limitations of Sovereignty
Cannot Be Presumed"
One author (Ralston) enumerates "legal presumptions" under the
general heading of "Evidence"67 while another (Schindler) maintains
that presumptions are unknown to international arbitral procedure, ex-
cept the Anglo-American principle of estoppel; 6 a third author (Sandifer)
holds that "International tribunals may recognize certain legal presump-
tions as affecting the primary burden of proof, but the presumptions are
so variously stated, and there is such a lack of uniformity in the circum-
stances of their application that no general rules in the matter can be
stated 6 9
However that may be, there is one presumption which deserves special
consideration, since it is derived from or based on a widely recognized
implication of the concept of sovereignty. The Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice has formulated this presumption as follows: "... in case
of doubt a limitation of sovereignty must be construed restrictively." 70
In other words, unless the contrary is proven a limitation of sovereignty
is not presumed. This presumption, however, is rebuttable: as evidenced
by several decisions rendered by international tribunals. Again, whenever
a text clearly contains a limitation of sovereignty resort to extraneous
evidence is not permissible and the principle that a limitation of sover-
eignty cannot be presumed is not applicable.7
66 See Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 Am. J. INTIL LAW 94f.
(1929).
67 RALSTON, ThE LAW AND PRocwDRnn OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBuNALS 223-225 (1926).
68 SCHINDLER, DIE SCNIEDSGERICHSBARxEIT sErr 1914 155 (1938). "Vorab is festzustellen,
dass Pr5sumptionen der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit unbekannt sind. Eine Aus-
nahme macht das dem englishen Recht entnommene Prinzip des estoppel . .. "
69 SANDIFER, Op. Cit., p. 98.
70 P. C.I. I., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 561. See also statement by the arbitrator (Mr.
Unden) in the Greek-Bulgarian dispute concerning some forests in Central Rhodope (1931)
[translation in 28 A.r. 3. INT'L LAW 760, 770 (1934)]. "It is a principle universally recognized
that a stipulation limiting the sovereignty of a state must be interpreted strictly. In case
of doubt limitation of sovereignty is not presumed."
71 See ROUssEAU, PRJNCIpES GgNRAuX DU Daorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 692 (1944),
1... interpritation restrictive n'est qu'un moyen subsidiaire exclusivement utilisable pour
l'claircissement de dispositions obscures ou 6quivoques; mais on ne saurait par ce procd6
contredire un texte clair."
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In support of this thesis the following decisions of international tribu-
nals may be quoted:
In the Arbitral award in divergence of opinion between German Gov-
ernment and Commissioner of Controlled Revenue, the arbitrator (Mr.
Sandenburg) held:'
: * . in the case in point the contention that the Commissioner's
interpretation of the Article would be an infringement of the sover-
eignty of the state is in reality a petitio principii; the fact that the
article constitutes a limitation on the exercise of the right of sover-
eignty makes it an obligation to interpret it strictly; but this obliga-
tion could never mean that the article is denied the meaning which
its wording formally requires; the exact meaning has therefore to
be determined by all justifiable means.'2
In the Oder Commission case the Permanent Court of International
Justice declared:
Nor can the court, on the other hand, accept the Polish Govern-
ment's contention that, the text being doubtful, the solution should
be adopted which imposes the least restriction on the freedom of
states. This argument, though sound in itself, must be employed
only with the greatest caution.7'
In its Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania the same Court
held:
The Court, having thus established that paragraph 1 of Article 5 of
the Declaration, both according to its letter and its spirit, confers
on Albanian nationals of racial, religious or linguistic minorities the
right that is stipulated in the second sentence of that paragraph,
finds it unnecessary to examine the subsidiary argument adduced
by the Albanian Government to the effect that the text in question
should in case of doubt be interpreted in the sense that is most
favourable to the sovereignty of the State. 4
Means of Evidence
"Means of evidence" (Moyens de la preuve, Beweismittel) are all
types of evidence which may be considered by a tribunal, irrespective
of whether the tribunal considers a particular piece of evidence relevant
or not. The designation of a piece of evidence as "means of evidence"
is a purely formal one, that is to say, the nature of the evidence and its
probative force are determined by the content of the evidence.
"Means of evidence" are frequently classified as: documentary and
72 Text in 21 Am. J. INT'L LAW 326, 343 (1927).
73 p. C. I. J., Series A, No. 23, p. 24.
74 P. C. I. J., Series A/B, No. 64, p. 22.
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testimonial,75 or written and oral." Documentary evidence, for instance,
includes travaux pr~paratoires, texts of international agreements, texts
of national laws, maps. By contrast, oral or testimonial evidence is usu-
ally secured by interrogation of witnesses or experts.
Under Article 53, paragraph 1 of the Rules of the International Court
of Justice witnesses and experts shall be examined by the agents, coun-
sel or advocates of the parties under control (autorit6) of the President
of the Court. Questions may be put to them by the President of the
Court and the judges. Before giving evidence in Court witnesses and ex-
perts are required to make a solemn declaration that they will speak the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truthY
It is controversial whether "hearsay evidence" is admissible, or whether
witnesses or experts are required to have personally known and observed
the facts to which they testify.78
"Affidavits," although not known in the so-called civil law countries,
are deemed generally admissible before international tribunals; 9 they
are considered an intermediary type, since they constitute a combination
of oral and written evidence.
It should be emphasized that under Article 57, paragraph 4 of the
Rules of the International Court of Justice a public international organi-
zation may on its own initiative furnish the Court with information
relevant to a case before the Court in the form of a Memorial to be
filed in the Registry. In this case the Court retains the right to require
additional information, orally or in writing, in the form of answers to any
questions which it may see fit to formulate, and to authorize the parties
to comment in writing on the information then furnished.
Conclusion
The foregoing brief survey of the principles and practice concerning
75 For this classification, see, SANDIFER, op. cit., p. 137f. on "Documentary evidence,"
and p. 206 on "Testimonial evidence".
76 For the distinction between written evidence (1a preuve icrite) and oral evidence (1a
preuve testimoniale) see WIrmNBG, L'ORGANISATION JuDIcIA E: LA PRocEnUE ET LA
SENTENcE INTERwATIONALES 243-256 (1937).
77 This rule is identical with Article 53 of the Rules of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national justice.
78 In favor of "hearsay evidence" see the Antonio Maximo Moro case quoted in SANDIFER,
op. cit., p. 123. Sandifer holds: "Generally speaking, there are no rules in international
judicial procedure against the admission of hearsay evidence, that is, evidence not based
on personal observation." Ibid., 257. By contrast, WiTENBERO, op. cit, p. 252, considers
hearsay evidence as inadmissible before international tribunals.
79 In reference to affidavits WITENBERG says, op. cit, p. 255: 'On Peut, actuellement,
considirer cette admissibiWt comme itant de coutume en droit international arbitral." See
also SANDI'ER, Op. Cit., p. 179f.
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extrinsic evidence in international law may be summarized by indicating
(i) principles relating to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence; (ii) principles
relating to extrinsic evidence only;"' (iii) principles germane to inter-
national law; (iv) principles common to domestic and international law.
(i) The following principles relate to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence:
1. International tribunals enjoy, in principle, the greatest free-
dom as to the admission of evidence, and are not bound by restric-
tive rules of evidence applicable in certain national legal systems.
2. International tribunals enjoy the greatest freedom in the ap-
preciation of evidence.
(ii) The following principle relates to extrinsic evidence only:
In the interpretation of treaties or any other rule of international
law an international tribunal may resort to extrinsic evidence if the
rule at issue is not dear. The Court is authorized to decide whether
or not a rule is clear. In resorting to extrinsic evidence, the Court
may resort to "sources of evidence" other than the disputed text or
rule such as travaux priparatoires; "circumstantial evidence" such
as conclusive acts, circumstances of the parties at the time a treaty
was entered into; subsequent conduct of the parties; relevant facts;
the intention of the parties; certain presumptions which render proof
unnecessary.
(iii) The following principle is germane to international law:
International tribunals enjoy, in principle, the greatest freedom as to
the admission of evidence, and are not bound by restrictive rules
of evidence applicable in certain national legal systems.
(iv) The following principles are common to domestic and inter-
national law:
1. Freedom in the appreciation of evidence.
2. The intention of the parties to an international agreement must
be ascertained, if the wording of the agreement is unclear.
On the whole, resort to extrinsic evidence is permissible in inter-
national law. However, extrinsic evidence will contribute to a clarification
of the available intrinsic evidence only if it is clear in itself and if it
adds new evidence which could not have been inferred from the intrinsic
evidence.
80 In this paper the term "extrinsic" evidence is used as synonym for "extraneous" evi-
dence; and the term "intrinsic" evidence is used as synonym for "internal" evidence. On
the treatment of extrinsic evidence in the practice of the Supreme Court of the United
States see Ten Broek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, a series of excellent articles on the subject,
in 26 and 27 CA=. L. REv. (1937-1939).
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